Book Review: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory by Alasdair MacIntyre
Introduction
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue is a landmark in contemporary moral philosophy, a deeply provocative critique of modern ethical discourse, and a powerful call to reclaim an Aristotelian tradition of the virtues. First published in 1981, and revised in its third edition in 2007 MacIntyre’s work resonates as a philosophical lament and a moral manifesto. The title subtly evokes the tone of perseverance and cultural memory, framing MacIntyre’s intellectual project as a waiting for moral clarity after the long nightfall of modern moral disarray.
Summary and Structure
The book begins with “A Disquieting Suggestion”, a hypothetical scenario in which the language and practices of science have been destroyed and only fragments remain. MacIntyre uses this parable to illustrate what he believes has happened to morality in the modern West: we retain the language of moral discourse, but its coherent structure and telos have been lost.
In Chapters 2 and 3, he explores emotivism, the theory that moral statements are merely expressions of preference or emotion. He argues that emotivism dominates modern culture and erodes the foundations of rational moral debate, as it severs moral language from truth claims and objective standards.
Chapters 4 through 6 trace the failure of the Enlightenment project to rationally justify morality apart from tradition or teleology. MacIntyre contends that Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, Hume, and Diderot sought a universal foundation for ethics, but, having abandoned Aristotelian teleology, were doomed to fail. This failure, he argues, led to the moral incoherence of modernity.
Chapters 7 and 8 address the limits of social science, critiquing its predictive shortcomings and its inability to offer a robust normative framework. Here, MacIntyre interrogates the role of expertise and the nature of explanation in contemporary social life.
Chapter 9, “Nietzsche or Aristotle?”, is pivotal: MacIntyre argues that Nietzsche is the only modern thinker to have fully grasped the implications of Enlightenment moral failure. Yet Nietzsche’s response, the will to power, leads only to the abyss. In contrast, MacIntyre turns to Aristotle for a more constructive path.
In Chapters 10 through 14, MacIntyre reconstructs a historical account of virtue ethics, from heroic societies to classical Athens, through Aristotle, and into medieval thought. He draws attention to how virtues are understood differently in each context but argues for the superiority of Aristotle’s formulation, especially as it relates to the telos—or ultimate purpose—of human life.
Chapters 15 and 16 deepen this argument by emphasizing the importance of narrative unity and tradition in shaping a coherent moral life. MacIntyre insists that virtue is intelligible only within the context of a lived tradition, one that provides the goals, standards, and practices through which moral life gains meaning.
Chapter 17 tracks evolving conceptions of justice, while Chapter 18, titled “After Virtue: Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and St. Benedict,” ends the work with a cultural and philosophical gesture: perhaps we need a new St. Benedict to re-found moral community—not through revolution, but through the quiet cultivation of virtue within small, intentional traditions.
The Postscript to the Second Edition offers valuable clarification of MacIntyre’s arguments and responds to critiques that misunderstand his project as nostalgic or relativist. Here, he reaffirms his rejection of both liberal individualism and emotivist ethics, and defends his commitment to rational tradition.
Critical Analysis
MacIntyre’s central thesis—that modern moral discourse is fragmented and incoherent due to the loss of an Aristotelian conception of the virtues—is both compelling and controversial. His genealogical critique of modern ethics is intellectually rigorous and historically grounded, though some have questioned whether his narrative oversimplifies the complexity of Enlightenment moral theory.
One of the book’s greatest strengths lies in its synthesis of philosophy and history. MacIntyre’s historical sweep—from Homeric epic to contemporary social theory—demonstrates the deep interdependence between moral theory and cultural practice. He does not merely critique modern ethics but offers a constructive vision of how we might recover moral rationality by returning to tradition-constituted and narrative-structured forms of life.
However, critics have noted potential weaknesses. Some argue that MacIntyre’s reliance on tradition risks endorsing moral conservatism or relativism. Others question whether Aristotelian ethics can be plausibly revived in pluralistic modern societies. Nevertheless, MacIntyre addresses these concerns by emphasizing that rational debate within and between traditions is still possible.
The call for a “new St. Benedict” has attracted particular attention. It underscores MacIntyre’s sense of cultural decline, yet also gestures toward hope: the possibility of moral renewal not through politics, but through communal practices of virtue.
Conclusion
After Virtue remains a foundational work in moral philosophy, unmatched in its scope, ambition, and moral seriousness. MacIntyre offers not just a critique but a profound alternative to the modern ethical condition—rooted in Aristotle, enriched by history, and attuned to the spiritual and communal dimensions of the moral life. With its enduring relevance across philosophy, theology, political theory, and ethics, After Virtue is not only a book to be read but to be lived—until the breaking of the day.
Citation
MacIntyre, A. (2007). After virtue: A study in moral theory (3rd ed.). University of Notre Dame Press.
