Veils of Virtue: The Discursive Life of Sectarianism in Pakistani Politics
Sectarianism in Pakistan is often seen as the residue of medieval theology, but its modern force comes not from dogma but from discourse. Political language rarely names sects directly; instead, it relies on euphemism, code, and moral binaries to sustain difference while maintaining deniability.
Terms such as "misguided youth," "foreign ideology," or "anti-state agenda" are used to describe minority groups without naming them, constructing a framework where suspicion is always present, but responsibility is always elusive. This discursive vagueness allows politicians to maintain plausible deniability while activating sectarian narratives.
Van Dijk’s theory of "ideological squaring"—where in-groups are associated with virtue and out-groups with vice—plays out clearly in Pakistani politics. Sunni majority identity is coded as patriotic and stable, while minority sects are framed as externalized threats, often through passive voice: “tensions erupted,” “violence occurred,” “a blast took place”—all syntactic forms that erase agency.
Meanwhile, the use of religious rhetoric like "ahl-e-haq" (people of truth) versus "fitna" (chaos) perpetuates sectarian dichotomies while appearing spiritually neutral. These lexical choices encode moral superiority, delegitimizing dissent or doctrinal plurality.
Even media reporting reinforces this framing. Attacks on Shia or Hazara and other minority groups/communities are often presented as "sectarian clashes," implying symmetry and mutual aggression, when in reality, the violence is asymmetrical and systemic.
To counteract sectarianism, Pakistan must go beyond policing hate speech. It must dismantle the linguistic scaffolding that allows hate to be spoken without being named.
