Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to New Delhi earlier this month was the first high-level Chinese engagement in India since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. The timing and tone of the visit underline what can best be described as a tactical reset — an attempt to stabilise relations without resolving deeper disputes.
Several factors explain the opening. On India’s side, external economic pressures, particularly from renewed U.S. tariff measures, have created incentives to manage ties with Beijing. For China, slowing growth and intensifying confrontation with Washington have made it important to prevent simultaneous tensions with its large neighbour. Both capitals thus saw merit in reducing friction and preparing ground for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.
Discussions in Delhi covered a range of issues. On the boundary question, Wang Yi and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval revived the Special Representatives’ dialogue and agreed to establish new mechanisms for sector-specific confidence-building along the Line of Actual Control. While far from a settlement, these measures are intended to minimise risks of escalation.
Economic and connectivity issues also featured prominently. China indicated willingness to ease curbs on exports of rare earths, fertilizers, and tunnel-boring equipment — sectors in which Indian dependence is significant. Both sides agreed to resume direct flights, reopen border trade through Himalayan passes, facilitate visas, restore hydrological data-sharing, and allow the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage to recommence. These steps are modest, but symbolically important in signalling a willingness to re-engage.
At the same time, it would be premature to read the visit as a strategic breakthrough. Fundamental points of contention remain unresolved: the contested border, Beijing’s close partnership with Islamabad, and India’s deepening security ties with Washington. Nor should the tactical reset obscure the reality that mutual suspicion runs deep, and neither side is likely to dilute its strategic hedging.
For Pakistan, the development is noteworthy. While India–China engagement does not diminish New Delhi’s alignment with Washington, it reflects a pragmatic willingness to compartmentalise disputes in order to address pressing economic and geopolitical challenges. That pragmatism, rather than rigid hostility, is the hallmark of statecraft in an era of shifting global balances.
Wang Yi’s Delhi visit was thus less a breakthrough than a pause: a temporary recalibration in response to wider pressures. The larger trajectory of the India–China relationship will continue to oscillate between competition and cautious accommodation. In that uncertain space, tactical resets will remain a recurring feature.
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